耐候钢标准

焊接结构用耐候钢板(GB4172-84)
高耐候性结构钢钢板(GB4171-84)
书 STAINLESS STEEL AND CORROSION by Claus Qvist Jessen ISBN
978-87-92765-00-0

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GB/T4171-2008

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耐候性能估计

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Jis G 3125

 

监管对桥梁建设的影响

旧金山湾区新桥建设的案例分析

OAKLAND — In the early 1930s, California designed and built the 8-mile Bay Bridge — west and east spans linked by the world’s biggest bore tunnel — in a mere 51/2 years. And workers did it ahead of schedule and for $78 million, well under budget.

Decades later, when the seismically shaky 2-mile eastern span needed to be replaced, California took five years just to figure out what the new span should look like and design it. Construction is taking more than twice as long, and the price tag — $6.4 billion — is 41/2 times higher than engineers estimated.

Put another way, the entire 1936 crossing cost $30,000 a foot in adjusted 2013 dollars while the shorter new span is setting back taxpayers $550,000 per foot.

Why can’t they do things the way they used to?

The reasons behind the gap say much about how big construction projects have changed from the time of the Great Depression, when creating jobs was paramount, to the modern era where worker safety and environmental laws have an enormous influence on the design, pace and cost of what is built.

“In the 1930s, the bridge itself was the thing people valued, and the engineers and contractors were in charge,” said Randy Rentschler, Metropolitan Transportation Commission government affairs director. “Since then, the values of our society have shifted 180 degrees, and it is reflected in how long it takes to get things done.”

No example is more dramatic than worker safety laws: 24 men died building the original bridge; none has perished on the new span. In the 1930s, the rule of thumb in high steel work was one death for every $1 million spent, an inconceivably high toll today.

Few dispute the need for safety regulations. But fear of litigation, environmental regulations and greater public involvement have also pushed out construction timelines and driven up costs in exchange for benefits not everyone agrees are worth the long wait.

When asked why engineers and builders 80 years ago could work so much faster, a contractor on the bridge half-jokingly described today’s construction landscape as the equivalent of asking workers to erect a bridge in record time with their hands tied behind their backs.

In the 1930s, Bay Bridge Chief Engineer Charles Purcell didn’t need four years and $155 million for an environmental impact study. And 1930s-era politicians had little or no formal say about how the bridge would look.

Purcell and his engineering colleagues chose a double suspension span for the west side and cantilevered steel trusses on the east based on three primary factors: a limited budget, San Francisco Bay geology, and navigation demands, wrote architect Donald MacDonald in “Bay Bridge: History and Design of a New Icon.”

It would be an additional 40 years before the U.S. adopted major environmental reforms such as the federal Endangered Species and Clean Water acts, which gave government agencies veto power over construction projects unless builders took steps to protect wildlife, air and water quality.

The only go-ahead Purcell needed was from the War Department, and President Herbert Hoover lent his considerable influence on that front.

Purcell also didn’t spend $11 million designing and testing a sound attenuation system, which involved pumping a dense air bubble curtain into the water to dissipate fish-killing sound pressure waves generated during pile driving.

Nor did Depression-era contractors have to:

Transplant and monitor a half-acre of marine eelgrass before dredging a construction barge channel.
Purchase tidal wetlands as mitigation for the loss of 3.4 acres of sand flats on the Oakland shore.
Build replacement nests for the cormorants roosting on the old span or attempt to lure them into their new digs with decoys and bird call recordings.
Place biological observers at the construction site or on tugboats towing barges loaded with dredged material to approved dumping sites west of the Farallon Islands.
Still, any or all of these measures can’t account for the huge cost difference between the two projects, agreed Caltrans Toll Bridge Program manager Tony Anziano. Adjusted to today’s dollars using the Consumer Price Index, the entire 1936 Bay Bridge cost $1.3 billion, compared with $6.4 billion for the new span.
Anziano attributes the gap to a combination of the more expensive regulatory and labor environments, significantly more stringent seismic requirements and political delays over design and alignment that upended the construction sequence. In 1936, 8,300 workers built the entire bridge. Nearly that many — 7,700 — are building just the 2-mile eastern span. An average union ironworker on the original bridge earned $11 a day. The California prevailing wage for an ironworker is $471.
“Individually, many of these factors don’t add up to a large percentage of the overall cost,” Anziano said. “But put it all together, and they add up.”
One of the biggest cost drivers was building a bridge strong enough to open within hours of the strongest temblor engineers predict will strike the Bay Area in the next 1,500 years.
The new span has deeper pilings, beefier foundations and some of the largest seismic stabilizers used on a bridge anywhere in the world. It also contains 70 percent more structural steel than the old bridge. This would prove particularly expensive when political delays pushed the construction schedule into a hot global steel market fueled by China’s rapid expansion.
The deepest timber piling on the old span is 235 feet — the deepest in the world at the time — but it sits in seismically vulnerable sand and mud. The new span’s 10-foot-diameter steel shafts were driven 300 feet into bedrock, at an angle to increase stability, using the world’s largest hydraulic jacks.
Unlike the 1930s, today’s engineers and contractors must erect a new bridge where one already exists and carries 270,000 vehicles a day. This has meant building expensive traffic detours on each end, including the $350 million S-curve, named after its gnarly lane twist, at Yerba Buena Island.
As to why Caltrans ever thought the hybrid replacement skyway and suspension span would open in May 2007 — a time frame the agency officially used until August 2004 — that’s “hard to explain,” Anziano conceded. “Realistically, from what we’ve experienced … it’s hard for me to see how we could have built this bridge any more quickly than we did.”
The state first pushed the date out to late 2011 and the schedule subsequently slipped an additional two years.
California Transportation Commissioner Jim Ghielmetti puts the blame squarely on the Bay Area’s choice of the relatively rare self-anchored suspension span design.
On a traditional suspension bridge, builders first erect the towers, then string the cable and hang the deck. A self-anchored bridge requires builders to put the deck into place using temporary supports. Then workers erect the tower, hang the cable and connect the deck. Lastly, the falsework is removed.
“Yes, it is iconic. But iconic costs a lot of money and time,” said Ghielmetti, president of Pleasanton-based Signature Homes.
The delay, some say, also risks lives. It has been 24 years since the Loma Prieta earthquake shook loose a 250-ton piece of the existing bridge’s upper deck and a motorist died. Engineers predict the old bridge will collapse in the next Big One.
The new bridge was set to open Sept. 3 until large steel rods used to secure seismic stabilizers snapped in March. Now, the date has been pushed out weeks or months awaiting repairs.
“Some of these delays and cost overruns are expected because these things happen in construction,” said state Senate Transportation Committee Chairman Mark DeSaulnier, D-Concord. “But not to the degree we’ve seen in the past 10 years. It’s not acceptable to put thousands of people every day at risk.”
Contact Lisa Vorderbrueggen at 925-945-4773 or Twitter.com/lvorderbrueggen.
New Bay Bridge:
Follow the money
Nowhere is the adage “Time is money!” more prophetic than on the new Bay Bridge.
Engineers’ cost estimates to replace the seismically shaky eastern half of the Bay Bridge have risen dramatically since February 1997, when then-Gov. Pete Wilson ordered it replaced rather than retrofitted.
In part, the projections grew because the bridge evolved from a no-frills crossing based on minimal design details, to a fully designed, single-tower self-anchored bridge with shoulders, lighting, architectural features, and a bicycle and pedestrian path.
Here’s the evolution of changes that affected the project’s total costs:
August 1997: Standard concrete viaduct with a cable-type suspension span but no bike lane or shoulders. (Cost $1.3 billion)
June 1998: Concrete skyway and single-tower self-anchored suspension span with shoulders, lighting, architectural features, and bicycle and pedestrian path, based on 30 percent design documents. (Cost $1.4 billion)
April 2001: Skyway fully designed and the plans for the suspension span at 65 percent. (Cost $2.6 billion)
August 2004: 100 percent designed and skyway under construction, but global steel prices skyrocket and post-911 climate drive up contractors’ costs for bonding. Caltrans admits earlier budget lacked sufficient contingency. (Cost $5.1 billion)
July 2005: Legislature shifts bridge construction management to new three-member oversight panel consisting of the executive directors of the Metropolitan Transportation Commission, California Transportation Commission and Caltrans. (Cost $5.4 billion)
December 2007: Under new management and after the contract for the most expensive piece of the bridge (the self-anchored suspension segment) was awarded, the rate of escalation slows. (Cost $5.6 billion)
May 2013: Inflation and delays associated with the complexity of fabricating and installing the massive steel decks, coupled with broken steel anchor rods in seismic stabilizers, continue to push the cost projections up, although not at the earlier rate. (Cost $6.4 billion)
Source: Caltrans, Bay Area Toll Authority
BRIDGES’ big costs
Building a suspension bridge is expensive and takes time. Here’s a look at how the Bay Bridge compares with other suspension bridges across the world in 2013 adjusted U.S. dollars and construction time:
Bay Bridge (eastern replacement span): Oakland, 2.2 miles, expected to open late 2013, $6.4 billion, 11 years and counting.
Great Belt East Bridge: Denmark, 4.2 miles, opened 1998, $4.4 billion, 10 years.
Verrazano-Narrows Bridge: New York, 2.6 miles, opened in 1964, $2.4 billion, five years and seven months.
Yeongjong Grand Bridge: South Korea, 2.7 miles, opened in 2000, $1.9 billion, five years.
Tsing Ma Bridge: China, 1.34 miles, opened 1997, $1.35 billion, five years.
Bay Bridge (original): Oakland-San Francisco, 8.25 miles, opened in 1936, $1.3 billion, three years and seven months.
George Washington Bridge: New York, 0.9 miles, opened 1931, $1.1 billion, four years.
Cooper River Bridge: South Carolina, 2.5 miles, opened in 2005, $836.9 million, four years and six months.
Tacoma Narrows Bridge: Washington, 1 mile, opened 2007, $827.7 million, five years.
Chesapeake Bay Bridge (westbound): Maryland, 4.3 miles, opened in 1973, $778.3 million, four years and six months.
Mackinac Bridge: Michigan, 5 miles, opened 1957, $583.9 million, four years.
Sunshine Skyway Bridge: Florida, 4 miles, opened in 1987, $501.5 million, five years.
Carquinez Bridge (eastbound): Vallejo-Crockett, 0.7 mile, opened in 2003, $465.9 million, four years.
Golden Gate Bridge: San Francisco, 1.7 miles, opened in 1937, $439.8 million, four years and four months.
And, although not a suspension span:
Benicia Bridge (northbound): Benicia-Martinez, 1.7 miles, opened 2007, $1.4 billion, seven years.
Sources: http://usinflationcalculator.com; Caltrans; PBS “Building Big”; Bay Area Toll Authority; Wikipedia; Structurae: International Database; news research; Engineering News-Record; and state departments of transportation in New, Florida, Washington, South Carolina and Maryland

Top Price bubbule for everything

TSX fully rebounded from oil price crash

Canadian Highquality Bond

Canadian Dollar Index

Shang Stock Exchange above average


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Asset Sale – Price Allocation

In the case of depreciable property, the vendor will be taxable on recapture, and no reserve is available. Recaptured depreciation is considered to be active business income for the purposes of the small business deduction. If a capital gain arises, the five-year capital gains reserve may be available if there is a balance of sale.Note2 A terminal loss may arise on depreciable property when the purchase price is less than the undepreciated capital cost of the property.
On the disposition of non-depreciable capital property, a capital gain or capital loss maybe realized or incurred. For the purchaser, the amount paid will represent the capital cost of the property.
http://www.cch.ca/newsletters/TaxAccounting/January2013/index.htm#Notes
Income Tax Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.))

Recaptured depreciation 13 (1)
Goodwill (34)
Class 14.1 — transitional rules P120
Taxable Capital Gains and Allowable Capital Losses p332

Change to goodwill tax
Eligible Capital Property is the tax term for an intangible asset held by a taxpayer.
On March 22, 2016, the new Liberal Minister of Finance, the Honourable Bill Morneau, tabled that government’s first budget. Included among the proposed changes was a plan to repeal the existing Eligible Capital Property regime and to fold ECP deductions into the existing Capital-Cost Allowance framework under the newly proposed class 14.1.

At the same time under the proposed rules the sale of ECP after January 1, 2017 will still be characterized akin to a capital gain. As such, 50% of the gain will be non-taxable and eligible for capital dividend treatment, while the remaining 50% will be characterized as income from investment, or passive income. The characterization of the 50% of the ECP sale as passive income means that any such income will be subject to Part IV tax and taxed at the high corporate rate of 50.67% in any holding corporation.

最富有的一代中国人正在远去 伟大幸运的时代终结

在苏东解体之后,全球化风起云涌,中国很好地利用了这个二战以来,对大国而言难得的战略机遇期,迅速崛起为全球重要力量。中国民众也在短期内基本摆脱贫困,积累了惊人财富。当下在中国涌现了一群千亿富豪。世易时移,随着中国政治、社会、经济的三重变迁,最富裕的这代中国人正在逐渐离我们远去。在未来中国,再度狂风骤雨般书写财富神话的机会,如过江之鲫般涌现的土豪群体已是过往,轻易实现人生小目标者可能逐渐寥若星晨。

我们罗列了十个理由,解释为什么最富裕的一代中国人在远去之中。

一是中国经济爆发式增长期已经过去。个人财富的积累取决于国家经济的兴衰,在过去20年,中国经济的增长令人眩目。回顾1997年东亚危机至今的20年,中国经济体量大涨:1997年之时中国GDP仅为7.85万亿元,当时人民币汇率为8.28,折合约9500亿美元,人均仅774美元。这大致仅和目前的乌干达等非洲贫困国家差不多,离当下的越南、印度都差得远。到了2016年,中国GDP已比1997年增长了近10倍,折合约为11万亿美元。中国成为全球第二大经济体,其体量和日、德、英三国的总和相当。中国富裕群体随着中国经济的崛起而涌现,人类也随着中国迈入现代化、城市化国家而取得了显著的减贫成绩单。过去20年,扣除掉中国的脱贫人口,地球的贫困人口变得不是不少,而是更多。请不要忘记,在1997年,中国虽然在当时是一个充满蓬勃活力之地,但其经济实力,仍然仅可归属为全球倒数的低收入国家。在未来,我们已不能指望中国重新复制爆发式经济增长。

二是中国人民币大发行的洒钱阶段可能已一去不复返。几乎每个中国人都在感叹货币如潮水一样涌来。在过去20年中国央行所发行的人民币规模,折合成美元,可能比地球上所有其他经济体加总起来还要多。这种快速发钞可能顺应了中国货币化和城市化的进程,但也可能存在着以超长周期的扩张性货币政策,支撑和强化了超长周期的经济增长。在1997年之际,中国的广义货币M2仅为9.1万亿,相当于当时GDP的115%,而到了2016年底,M2已是155万亿,相当于GDP的两倍。如此超级货币周期恰好搭配了史无前例的庞大工业化、现代化进程,保证了中国物价指数CPI的中枢水平不升反降。这一点可能和普通民众的直观感受相悖。在90年代中国还是很容易遭遇5%以上的物价涨幅,而近年来,3%的CPI都不多见了。庞大而廉价的消费品滚滚而来。这种发钞节奏,决定了存钱不如借钱,借小钱不如借大钱,冒险者迅速攫取了谨慎者的财富。在未来,我们已不能指望央行再度任性发钞。

三是中国最惊人而无度的行业暴富机会已消退。回顾1997年,中国还不存在市场化的房地产行业,私家车对绝大多数国人而言还是个奢侈的梦想。20年间,从攫取矿业等资源,到房地产开发等人脉和资金密集行业,再到IT和互联网等科技英雄时代,挖矿的、盖房的、用网络开全球地摊货的,以及少量做制造业和消费品实体的,构成了中国富裕人群的基本特质。由于金融业没有掌握在私人部门手中,因此金融业的暴发户反而不是那么庞大。投资回报率在中国迅速走低,2012年之前,中国投资回报率ROE估计在12%-18%之间,而当下扣除金融业之外,中国实体经济的ROE约为7%。不仅如此,经过4-5年政策刺激的高科技行业,也蕴藏了巨大泡沫,这些泡沫在已经破灭、有待破灭和深度破灭之中。中国进入了低利率时期的优质资产荒困境。在未来,人们很难指望中国还会涌现凭胆气耍流氓拉关系就能搞定的暴利行业。

四是中国人最显著的收入增长期似乎也已远去,涨工资越来越难了。过去20年是中国普通劳工收入增长最显著的一段岁月。从国家的角度看,1997年中国的外汇储备只有1400亿美元,而现在即便是告别了2014年的外储高峰,也还是有3万亿美元外储的,涨了20倍。从工薪族的角度看,1997年城镇职工大约7亿人,当年工资总额9602亿元,折合年工资收入仅为1380元,月薪也就120元。到2016年估计城镇职工约7.9亿人,工资总额达12万亿,折合年和月工资分别为1.5万和1250元。上述数据可能和普通民众的直观感受不一致。尽管如此,从不太靠谱的数据看,20年中国经济增长10倍,职工工资也增长了10多倍。其实当下普通工薪族月薪在3-5千,京沪等一线城市中位数月薪大约为1万元。普罗大众尚且如此,中国富裕阶层的财富积累显然更为惊人。万元户已作古,人生小目标才有些气魄。在未来,中国人口红利的远去和劳动力成本的不断攀升,使得收入增长必然随着经济成长回落的大势而不再汹涌。

五是中国最蔚为壮观的资产价格膨胀可能也已接近巅峰。中国人资产配置日益多元化,除了传统的银行储蓄之外,中外房地产、股票、理财、艺术品等纷至沓来。在各种资产价格膨胀中,最为引人瞩目的是楼市和艺术品市场。1997年,中国还无所谓房地产市场,2000年前后,京沪市区的商品房价也就在每平米四五千,现在则动辄10万,一线城市房价足足涨了15-20倍,全国房价的普遍涨幅也不会少于10倍。过去20年对待中国楼市唯一的正确方式可能就是买买买。当下可能很少有人有勇气或机会再重新开启这样的模式。艺术品市场更今非昔比,甚至造就了大量泥沙俱下的文玩骗子。是什么拉开了人与人之间的贫富差距?很可能不是工资收入差异造成的,而是是否买房置业拉开了贫富差异。你若在一线城市有两三套房,基本就迈入千万富翁俱乐部。当中国的房价等资产价格到了今天的高位,在未来,中国资产价格很可能不是令人艳羡的,而可能是蕴含风险甚至陷阱的。

六是中国家庭部门最轻松的税负阶段将迅速成为过往,税收和死亡是必可避免的趋势。和西方国家相比,中国家庭部门的税负是非常轻的,这个基本事实可能许多国人并不认同。中国税制的特点是名义税率重,实际税率不重;所得税地位不重,流转增值等间接税税负过重;企业税负重,居民税负不重、相比工薪阶层,巨富阶层的税负可能更为轻微。过去20年,从GDP初次分配看,企业占20-25%,家庭部门尽管占比下降仍占近60%;但从税收占比看,企业贡献了近70%,家庭部门贡献仅约12%。直到2016年,中国政府征缴的个人所得税也仅刚突破1万亿元。高收入人群的税负过轻和敛财过速是平行的。如果企业税负无法更沉重,那么家庭部门的税负必然显著增加。在未来,涉及个人税负的“三重门”将陆续出现,即遗产税,房产税和更完善的个人所得税。无论如何,家庭部门税负整体过轻,结构失衡的状况无法延续。

七是中国人力资源最廉价高效的积累阶段可能正在远去,尽管中国政府仍然苦苦坚持。当下中国的富裕人群,按照1997年之前大学毕业算起,大致是40向上的年龄,更年轻的富豪群体暂时还不是主流。很幸运的是,彼时在中国的中学和高等教育还是非常便宜和高效的,贫苦子弟进入名牌大学的机会多多。而当下,中国教育不公现象似乎在抬头,重点中学的入门竞争,国际学校的遍地开花,高考招生的奇特录取线,漂洋过海的中国学子,使得从教育层面开始,社会阶层的纵向流动已很不顺畅。从城市给排水本科的王石,到双学士的姚振华;从会讲英语的马云到会写程序的雷军、张晓龙,中国教育体制使得无数中国少年获得了良好教育,成就了自身的人力资源。精英式而非大众式的教育理念,对实现这一代人的财富梦想功不可没。在未来,尽管中国高等教育毛入学率已达大众化程度,但中国父母将孩子从婴幼儿抚养到大学生的成本已大为提高,教育公平造就财富英雄潮在弱化。

八是中国最节俭的一代人在谢幕,新生代能花不能挣的迹象逐渐显露。中国人传统上爱储蓄,1997年,中国城乡居民的储蓄仅为4.6万亿元,这在当时相当于城镇职工3年多的工资;2016年底估计居民储蓄已接近60万亿元,大约相当于城镇职工5年的工资。如果考虑到房产,除储蓄之外的金融动产,那么中国人在过去20年积累下来的财富更为庞大。考虑到庞大财富的积累早于人均GDP达到1万美元的门槛,这个财富存量总体上是依赖节俭和储蓄而成。但总体上中国家庭部门的储蓄率已在下滑之中。舒适的成长环境带来更强安全感、更强依赖心的新生代,他们花钱多过挣钱,追新逐异多过勤俭节约。在未来,中国人不太可能重复过去20年的高储蓄,甚至已积累的庞大财富都有可能被逐渐消耗。老龄化和新生代共同催生日益临近的坐吃山空。

九是中国贫富悬殊最为惊人反差的世代不可维持,旧格局必将被打破。中国最富裕群体的形成可能有两层含义,富裕感的一种含义是,业已涌现的富豪,多半经历了人生从苦难走向富裕的艰难历程,贫困记忆和富足现实给其强留的幸福富裕感,这和浸泡在蜜罐中长大的群体,所感受到的富裕迥异。富裕感的另一种含义是巨大的贫富悬殊。2016年,中国最富裕的10大富豪拥有1.2万亿元,而他们的公益投入为230亿,除了马化腾先生和何巧女士之外,绝大多数中国富豪敛财之心压倒了一切,甚至不放过他们自己的身体和灵魂。中国120万人拥有中国家庭部门全部可投资金融资产的37%。贫富鸿沟触目惊心。在未来,随着政府推动社会公平进程,食利阶层难以长袖善舞。

十是中国所经历的伟大而幸运的时代,在快速划上句号。过去20年,人类经历了波澜壮阔的全球化时期,中国抓住了改革开放的良机。特朗普现象的出现,及其在欧洲可能蔓延之势,都标志着这个伟大而幸运时代的终结。中国和平发展的战略机遇期即便尚未终结,其内涵和形式也一定已发生了重大改变。中国最富裕的这一代人的崛起,既依赖个人奋斗,但更大程度上是发了“国运财”,圈了块地、占了个矿,钻了个法律的空子的模式不能不终结。即便全球化在碎片化,孤立主义在抬头,中国崛起之势难阻。但这已不意味着中国已有的老式富豪可以延续其敛财的陈旧模式。

回顾20年世事变迁,很可能最富有的一代中国人在逐渐远去,人们怀着复杂的心情旁观他们。深刻的时代烙印,和并不足以驾驭庞大财富的有限心智,使得这一代富裕阶层可以得到普罗大众的羡慕,但难以得到公众的追随和认同。最富裕一代中国人的整体形象支离破碎,光怪陆离,他们拥有庞大的财富,但不太可能赢得同样巨大的尊重。如果王健林或者马云老去,远去,会有人为此唏嘘吗?很难。引领中国未来富裕群体的灵魂人物,尚未出现。

(作者系北京师范大学教授,经济学家。)